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Susan N. Hermant
I. INTRODUCTION
Some say that September 11 changed everything. The
shock waves from September 11 have certainly shaken our
institutional as well as our physical structures. The widely
shared idea that since that day we have been a nation at war
against terrorism has profoundly challenged many of our
previous understandings about the meaning of our
Constitution as well as our previous definition of "war" itself.
The reactions of the federal government to the attacks
on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon have already
been transformative. Congress responded to the attacks by
enacting a sheaf of new legislation, most prominently the USA
PATRIOT Act, which revises hundreds of federal laws about
criminal law enforcement, surveillance, immigration, and
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information sharing among federal agencies,' and the
Homeland Security Act, which creates a new locus of federal
authority.! Congress's September 2001 Use of Force Resolution'
became the basis for the President's invasion of Afghanistan
and then Iraq. The President issued an executive order
providing for the use of military tribunals instead of civilian
courts to try terrorism suspects,' while federal agencies,
especially the Department of Justice, have promulgated
regulations that substantially change previous policies about
detention of illegal immigrants, enforcement of immigration
law, information sharing, and public access to information.
Questions about the constitutionality of many of these
revisions of federal law and policy have drawn an ever-
increasing amount of critical and public attention as people
throughout the country have debated whether we as a nation
are willing to recalibrate what we thought was the proper
balance between our civil liberties and our security. Scholars,
the press, and the general public have been debating issues
like whether the Patriot Act goes too far in threatening First
and Fourth Amendment values,' whether racial profiling of
Arab and Muslim men at airports is an unacceptable form of
discrimination,6 and whether non-citizens should be subject to
detention and deportation because of their associational
affiliations.7 These debates pose profound questions about the
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
2 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135
(codified in scattered sections of 6 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 50 U.S.C.).
3 Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong., Pub. L.
No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
4 Executive Order, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens
in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
5 See, e.g., GILMORE COMMISSION, V. FORGING AMERICA'S NEW NORMALCY:
SECURING OUR HOMELAND, PROTECTING OUR LIBERTY 1, E-1 to E-14 (2003); LAWYERS
COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, IMBALANCE OF POWERS: How CHANGES TO U.S. LAW &
POLICY SINCE 9/11 ERODE HUMAN RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES 2-8 (2003); LAWYERS
COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, ASSESSING THE NEW NORMAL: LIBERTY AND SECURITY
FOR THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11 UNITED STATES 6-17 (2003); LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS, A YEAR OF LOSS: RE-EXAMINING CIVIL LIBERTIES SINCE SEPTEMBER 11
(2002).
6 See, e.g., Christopher Edley, Jr., The New American Dilemma: Racial
Profiling Post-9/11, in THE WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF
TERRORISM 170-92 (Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr., eds., 2003); Sharon Davies,
Profiling Terror, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 45 (2003); AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
SANCTIONED BIAS: RACIAL PROFILING SINCE 9/11 (2004), available at
http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=15102&c=207 (last visited Aug.
2, 2204).
, See DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2003).
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extent to which we are willing to allow the events of 9/11 to
alter our preexisting definitions of the individual rights
guaranteed by the Constitution.
A smaller number of commentators have also noted the
impact or potential impact of the Patriot Act and other
revisions of the law on another plane of the Constitution: the
separation of powers among the three branches of the federal
government. Power, as if by centripetal force, has been flowing
to the President, who has adopted an expansive reading of his
authority as Commander-in-Chief. Aside from the question of
whether military tribunals might deny individuals
constitutional rights promised by the Bill of Rights,
constitutional lawyers have questioned whether the President
has the power to make the decision about whether to employ
such tribunals in the absence of congressional action. May the
President authorize the use of military tribunals and designate
the "enemy combatants" to be tried there rather than in
civilian courts, or must Congress play a greater roleT Has the
Patriot Act unduly aggrandized executive authority and
inappropriately diminished the role of the courts in approving
surveillance?' Have the courts been overly deferential to the
political branches in, for the most part, approving their
actions,"°  or overly intrusive in finding other actions
unconstitutional?" The future balance of power among the
8 See, e.g., Neal K. Katyal & Laurence Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt:
Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259 (2002); Ruth Wedgewood, Al Qaeda,
Terrorism, and Military Commissions, 96 AM. J.L. 328 (2002).
9 See STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, THE ENEMY WITHIN: INTELLIGENCE
GATHERING, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE WAKE OF SEPTEMBER 11
(2002); AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, UNPATRIOTIC ACTS: THE FBI'S POWER TO
RIFLE THROUGH YOUR RECORDS AND PERSONAL BELONGINGS WITHOUT TELLING YOU
(2003), available at http.//www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=13246&c=207
(last visited Aug. 2, 2004); Susan N. Herman, The USA Patriot Act and the USA
Department of Justice: Losing Our Balances?, THE JURIST, Dec. 3, 2001, available at
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/forumnew40.htm (last visited Aug. 2, 2004).
'0 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated by 124 S. Ct.
2633 (June 28, 2004); Susan N. Herman, Yasser Hamdi and the Fourth Circuit's Legal
No-Man's Land, THE JURIST, Jan. 13, 2003, available at
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/forumnew84.php (last visited Aug. 2, 2004) (criticizing
the decision as overly deferential). See also North Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 308
F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that there is no constitutional right to access to
deportation hearings), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1056 (2003).
" See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that a
designated "enemy combatant" was unconstitutionally detained), rev'd on other
grounds by 124 S. Ct. 2711 (June 28, 2004); Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278 (9th Cir.
2003), judgment vacated and remanded in light of Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2932
(June 30, 2004), amended, reinstated and transferred to District Court of District of
Columbia, No. 03-55785, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 27800 (9th Cir. July 8, 2004); Detroit
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three branches of the federal government as well as the
meaning of the Articles of the Constitution allocating their
powers will depend on how these questions are answered.
What has largely escaped critical attention so far,
however, is that the involvement of state and local
governments in combating terrorism may also be challenging
our constitutional structures of government on yet another
plane: federalism. To what extent might the increased
preeminence of the federal government and particular actions
taken in the context of the war on terror affect our
understanding of the proper relationship between the federal
and state or local governments? Will the recent Supreme Court
decisions about the Constitution's balance of national and local
power, so central to the work of the Rehnquist Court, stand, or
will they be questioned or modified in the light of current
events?
While structural questions about federalism might seem
abstract and even dry to non-lawyers, the participants in the
David G. Trager Public Policy Symposium held at Brooklyn
Law School on November 21, 2003,2 recognized these questions
as timely, fascinating, and extraordinarily challenging. The
boundaries of federalism are critical to the war on terror
because the Supreme Court's case law may limit how far the
federal government can go in enlisting state and local law
enforcement officials in their terrorism investigations. For
example, may the federal government require local law
enforcement officials to question suspects or to enforce
immigration law, or order a seaport to upgrade its security
measures if those upgrades will have to be paid for by a city or
Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that there is a
constitutional right of access to deportation hearings at least under the circumstances
of that case); Susan N. Herman, Checking Our Balances, AMER. LAWYER, July 2003,
available at www.law.com/ jsp/article.jsp?id=1056139904894 (arguing for meaningful
judicial review of government's anti-terrorism actions).
12 The participants included Ann Althouse (University of Wisconsin Law
School), Vikram Amar (University of California at Hastings Law School), Erwin
Chemerinsky (then at the University of Southern California Law School, now at the
Duke University School of Law), Paul Finkelman (University of Tulsa College of Law),
Lucas Guttentag (ACLU Immigrants Rights Project), Arnold M. Howitt (Taubman
Center for State and Local Government, John F. Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University), Vicki C. Jackson (Georgetown Law School), Jason Mazzone
(Brooklyn Law School), Burt Neuborne (New York University School of Law), Elizabeth
Rindskopf Parker (Dean, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law), Judith
Resnik (Yale Law School), Hon. David G. Trager (United States District Judge, Eastern
District of New York, former Dean, Brooklyn Law School), and Ernest A. Young
(University of Texas Law School), and myself as convenor and moderator.
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state? Conversely, the Supreme Court's case law may also limit
how far state and local governments can go in refusing to
cooperate with those federal investigative efforts. May local law
enforcement officials, for example, refuse to disclose the
immigration status of their local residents to federal officials
because they wish to encourage residents, regardless of their
immigration status, to use police and other local services?
Part of the challenge in confronting such questions
about spheres of authority arises from the fact that the recent
constitutional law constraining political choice about the
relationship between national authority and local autonomy
has been fostered by Justices and scholars at the conservative
end of the political spectrum, who have tended to disfavor big
centralized government and to champion local choice." These
judicially crafted limitations on federal power have generally
been opposed by those at the other end of the political
spectrum, who have tended to favor a strong federal role in
areas like civil rights enforcement and environmental
regulation and to be skeptical of "states' rights" arguments. 4
The federalism-based limitations the Supreme Court developed
during the 1990s were applied to prevent Congress from
enacting gun control laws,' remedies for violence against
women," and particular remedies for civil rights violations.
Now that the federal government may be perceived by those
toward the left of the political spectrum as a greater threat to
individual liberty, the potential antidote of local autonomy may
seem more attractive than it did during periods when states'
rights arguments were associated with arch-segregationists.
And now that the federal government's agenda is to promote
national security, centralized federal authority may seem more
essential to those who believed that individual states should be
13 See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Welcome to the Dark Side: Liberals Rediscover
Federalism in the Wake of the War on Terror, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1277 (2004).
14 See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a
National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903 (1994). See also Young, supra note 13.
" United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898 (1997).
16 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
17 Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding that Congress
may not enforce damages provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
against state employers); Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356
(2000) (holding that Congress may not enforce damages provision of the Americans
with Disabilities Act against state employers); but see Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v.
Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (holding that damages provision of Family and Medical
Leave Act may be enforced against state employers).
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allowed to opt out of federal schemes for civil rights or labor
law enforcement. To what extent will judges and scholars who
had identified themselves with a position on the law of
federalism rethink their commitments and take up the
structural arguments of the other side? Where is the line
between principle and politics? Will the Supreme Court's
federalism doctrine affect the war on terror, or will the war on
terror affect that body of law?
The papers published in this symposium issue begin an
important national conversation on the subject of federalism
and the war on terror. To discern the common threads among
these papers, readers will find it useful to consider first, the
very brief bird's-eye view of federalism in United States history
provided here; second, a description of the problems (each
based on actual current events) that the symposium
participants were asked to consider and discuss; and finally, a
brief description of the articles themselves.
II. THE CURRENT LAW OF FEDERALISM: OF PRINTZ AND
PREEMPTION
The questions of when state and local governments may
enforce their own laws and how much they can be required to
accede to and even cooperate with federal law, have been
central throughout the history of our country. One impetus for
the drafting of the Constitution was to enhance the role the
federal government had played under the Articles of
Confederation."s The Constitution provides a general outline of
the relative powers of the federal and state governments but
not a blueprint for how those powers are to be allocated. The
Supremacy Clause clearly states that federal laws consonant
with the Constitution will be Supreme1" but the text of Article I,
in its grant of powers to Congress and its limitation on the
states, ° and the Tenth Amendment, reserving to "the states
respectively or the people thereof' the powers not conferred on
" See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison); THE FEDERALIST NOS. 15 &
27 (Alexander Hamilton); ANDREW C. MCLAUGHLIN, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES 137-47 (1936).
19 U.S. CONST., art. VI § 2 ("This Constitution, and the laws of the United
States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the
land....").
20 See U.S. CONST., art. I, §§ 8, 10.
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the federal government, 2 do not provide any simple referent for
deciding how far federal power may extend, or whether the
states truly have spheres of autonomy the federal government
may not invade. The Supreme Court, fondly describing the
balance of power the Constitution attempted to strike as "Our
Federalism," has taken different positions over the years in
calibrating how that balance is to be attained.
When the Constitution was young, foundational
opinions by Justices John Marshall and Joseph Story nurtured
the newborn federal government and protected it against
defiant claims of autonomy raised by powerful states.
Maryland wanted to tax the Bank of the United States as a
business within its state lines, but in McCulloch v. Maryland
2
1
Marshall held that this claim of state prerogative unduly
threatened federal interests as determined by Congress. The
Supremacy Clause, as interpreted, prevented citizens of an
individual state from impeding a federal enterprise; Maryland's
action was considered a threat to federal interests because the
power to tax is the power to destroy and because Marshall saw
another version of the detested taxation without representation
in a tax that would be paid by those beyond Maryland's borders
but benefit only those within Maryland.
In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee" the Court ruled against
Virginia's claim of authority to decide a dispute about the
ownership of Virginia real estate without Supreme Court
interference, on the ground that interpretation of a federal
treaty was involved and that the United States Supreme Court
must have the final authority to interpret that treaty, even if
that meant overruling the highest court in Virginia. In both of
these cases, the Articles of the Constitution, which predated
the Bill of Rights, were interpreted as allowing the federal
government to subordinate local interests to its own national
interests not because any individual had a right enforceable
against Maryland or Virginia, but because of the structures of
government the Constitution had created.
On the other hand, state and local entities also played a
critical role in influencing national events, even including the
foundation of the country. Local committees of correspondence
21 U.S. CONST., amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.").
22 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
23 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
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were instrumental in fomenting the Revolution. The national
Declaration of Independence was preceded by a series of local
declarations of independence. Resolutions written by Thomas
Jefferson and James Madison and adopted by the legislatures
of Kentucky and Virginia respectively, argued forcefully
against some of the first controversial federal legislation, the
Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798. These resolutions maintained
that the Sedition Act in particular violated the First
Amendment, engendering debates about the proper role of the
states in interpreting the United States Constitution.
The profoundly divisive issue of slavery pitted national
authority against state autonomy in surprising ways. Congress
and the Supreme Court tried to enforce the Constitution's
uneasy compromise, which allowed states to decide for
themselves whether to permit slavery, by limiting the
prerogatives of the free states. Pennsylvania tried to enforce its
own anti-slavery policies by requiring meaningful process and
proof before allowing an alleged fugitive slave to be seized in
Pennsylvania and extradited to a slave state under the federal
Fugitive Slave Law. The Supreme Court held that the federal
law preempted even Pennsylvania's procedural modifications.2
Even more notoriously, the Court held that the federal
Constitution prevented Missouri from making Dred Scott a free
man and a citizen of the state.' Ultimately, the structure the
Constitution had provided could not contain or resolve the
fundamental clashes over slavery and states' rights which were
to erupt in the Civil War. Following the war, the
Reconstruction Era Amendments to the Constitution
fundamentally rearranged the relationship between the federal
and the state governments." The newly minted constitutional
limitations imposed on the states empowered the federal
government to take the lead in promoting a newly expanded
national agenda, including matters like racial equality, even
over the most adamant resistance of state and local
governments. The areas where the federal government could
preempt local law, and where the states' own choices could be
overruled, grew exponentially.
24 Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842); see Paul Finkelman,
The Roots of Printz: Proslavery Constitutionalism, National Law Enforcement,
Federalism, and Local Cooperation, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1399 (2004).
25 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
26 U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV.
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During the twentieth century, a long series of Supreme
Court cases known to all first-year constitutional law students
reacted to increasing federal regulation by first resisting and
later approving Congress's power to legislate under the
Commerce Clause.27 By mid-century, it appeared that the
courts would not challenge Congress's political decisions about
what to regulate on a national level. But in another historic
series of decisions beginning in 1995, the Supreme Court
revived judicially-enforced limitations on federal power, setting
out constitutional rules that circumscribed the relationship
between the federal and state and local governments, and
limiting Congress's power both under the Commerce Clause"
and the Fourteenth Amendment."
The current law of federalism empowers state and local
governments, but only within limits. On the one hand, the
Rehnquist Court derived from the Tenth Amendment a rule
that the federal government is prohibited from
"commandeering" local law enforcement officials. ° In the main
case elucidating this principle, Printz v. United States,3 the
Court found unconstitutional a provision of the federal Brady
Act that required local law enforcement officials to assist in
conducting background checks before issuance of a gun permit.
The Court reasoned that the states, as discrete sovereigns,
must have the right to choose whether to participate in a
federal enforcement program. State employees are paid with
state resources and therefore, according to Justice Antonin
Scalia, must always have the right to decline to implement a
federal program. In a dissenting opinion written on behalf of
four members of the Court, Justice John Paul Stevens argued
27 See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935) (invalidating federal regulation of poultry market); Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,
298 U.S. 238 (1936) (invalidating federal regulation of coal industry); United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (allowing federal wage and hour requirements); Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (allowing federal regulation of wheat consumed by the
farmer who grew it).
21 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating federal law
criminalizing possession of a firearm in a school zone); United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598 (2000) (finding Commerce Clause an inadequate constitutional basis for
Violence Against Women Act).
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (finding Congress's enforcement power
under the Fourteenth Amendment an inadequate basis for Violence Against Women
Act); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (finding Fourteenth Amendment
insufficient basis for Congress's enactment of Religious Freedom Restoration Act).
30 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that Congress
may not require state legislature to enact legislation).
31 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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that if the federal interest were sufficiently grave, both logic
and history argued for allowing the federal government to
enlist local law enforcement agents in implementing a program
representing the political will of the nation as a whole.2
Uncannily, Stevens anticipated that a battle against
international terrorism might provide an occasion for requiring
local law enforcement officials to assist federal agents.' Justice
Scalia's majority opinion, however, took the position that there
could be no balancing and no exceptions to the anti-
commandeering principle because the structures of the
Constitution are fixed, inviolate, and cannot bend depending on
the nature of the federal interest involved.'
In the fall of 2001, federalism first challenged federal
hegemony in combating terrorism when the FBI requested the
assistance of local law enforcement officials in questioning
some 5,000 Arab and Muslim men around the country. The
Detroit Chief of Police, among other local officials, declined
because he thought that cooperating with the federal effort
would impede his own law enforcement agenda by undermining
his relationship with Arab and Muslim men in his community.'
The Portland, Oregon Chief of Police also declined, pointing to
an Oregon state law that prohibited such questioning in the
absence of probable cause."6 Because Printz had held that local
officers could not be "commandeered" to help enforce federal
gun control laws, federal and local officials alike assumed that
the local law enforcement agents could choose not to cooperate
with the FBI interrogation program.
32 Printz, 521 U.S. at 939.
Id. at 940 ("Matters such as the enlistment of air raid wardens, the
administration of a military draft, the mass inoculation of children to forestall an
epidemic, or perhaps the threat of an international terrorist, may require a national
response before federal personnel can be made available to respond.").
34 Id. at 932.
[Wihere, as here, it is the whole object of the law to direct the functioning of
the state executive, and hence to compromise the structural framework of
dual sovereignty, such a "balancing" analysis is inappropriate. It is the very
principle of separate state sovereignty that such a law offends, and no
comparative assessment of the various interests can overcome that
fundamental defect. . . . We . . . conclude categorically, as we concluded
categorically in New York: "The Federal Government may not compel the
States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program."
Id. (internal citations omitted).
35 Fox Butterfield, Some Police Chiefs Object to Interviews, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
22, 2001, at A4.
36 Fox Butterfield, A Nation Challenged: The Interviews; A Police Force
Rebuffs F.B.I. on Querying Mideast Men, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2001, at B7.
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On the other hand, the Supreme Court has also held
that because of the Supremacy Clause,37  the federal
government may preempt state or local laws that thwart
national interests." In the classic case of Olmstead v. United
States," for example, the Court ruled that the federal
government could with impunity ignore a Washington state
statute that prohibited wiretapping. Because the Supremacy
Clause entitled federal agents to override local laws in
promoting their national agenda, the agents were permitted to
use evidence of bootlegging that they had obtained by
wiretapping Olmstead's telephone in disregard of the state law.
It is also unquestioned that the federal government has the
power to send its own FBI agents into Detroit or to Portland,
Oregon, to conduct interrogations regardless of the wishes of
the Detroit Chief of Police or the restrictions of Oregon state
law. Printz prohibits commandeering local law enforcement
officials, but does not prohibit circumventing or ignoring them
or their state and local laws.
This facet of federalism, limiting the impact of local
autonomy, has also come into play in the war on terror as state
and local governments have been making their own diverse
decisions about whether the new federal anti-terrorism
legislation goes too far in infringing privacy, liberty, free
speech, or freedom of association. There are now well over
three hundred cities, towns, and villages, as well as four states
(Alaska, Hawaii, Maine, and Vermont), that have enacted
variations of an ACLU-inspired Bill of Rights Defense
Committee resolution expressing disagreement with various
Patriot Act provisions and sometimes prohibiting local officials
from assisting in federal enforcement efforts in various ways.
40
Because of cases like Olmstead, it is generally assumed that
these local governments may not resist or limit federal
enforcement efforts within their jurisdictions, even though,
because of Printz, they may not be required to offer their own
services to help. But may a local legislature order its local law
enforcement officials not to cooperate with federal agents, or
" U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
38 See, e.g., American Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (holding
that federal law preempts California remedies for Holocaust survivors); Crosby v.
National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (holding that federal law
preempts Massachusetts policy with respect to trade with Myanmar).
39 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
40 See Bill of Rights Defense Committee, at http://www.bordc.org (last visited
Aug. 11, 2004).
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even impose a fine on its officials if they do provide such
assistance?"
Although the lines drawn by Olmstead and Printz are
sharp in theory, the concept of "cooperation" quickly begins to
appear fuzzy when applied to particular sets of facts. At what
point does the federal right to override local prohibitions,
sanctioned by Olmstead, become the illicit commandeering
prohibited by Printz? To what extent may the federal
government preempt local laws when individual state or local
law enforcement officials are willing to cooperate with federal
investigations but are prevented from doing so by state or local
legislation? At what point does the refusal of states and
localities to cooperate with the federal government become
interference with federal law and raise the Supremacy Clause
problem of McCulloch? The problems described in the next
section illustrate the complexity of the questions posed in
applying the principles of Printz and preemption to such
situations.
III. PROBLEMS IN FEDERALISM
At the Trager Symposium, participants discussed the
law of federalism, as briefly described above, as applied to five
problems, all of which are actual examples of national/local
border skirmishes that have arisen in conjunction with the war
on terror.
A. Local Autonomy? Police Chiefs' Refusal to Participate in
FBI Interviews
In November, 2001, as mentioned above, Attorney
General John Ashcroft requested the assistance of local police
departments in interviewing, on the basis of a list compiled by
the FBI, foreign men of Middle Eastern origin living within
their communities to determine whether any of these men
presented a terrorist threat or had useful information about
possible terrorists. While most police departments agreed to
the Attorney General's request, some refused and others
expressed concerns, either normative concerns about the
fairness of the interrogation program or practical concerns
41 See, e.g., CITY OF ARCATA, CAL., ORDINANCE No. 1339 (Apr. 2, 2003)(Ordinance Amending the Arcata Municipal Code to Defend the Bill of Rights and Civil
Liberties).
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about whether acting as de facto federal agents would impede
their ability to do their own jobs by causing adverse reactions
in the targeted communities. Andrew Kirkland, Acting Chief of
Police in Portland, Oregon, argued that his officers could not
interview individuals who were simply named on the FBI's list
but not suspected of any specific crime because state law
required a showing of probable cause prior to conducting such
interviews. 2 In Detroit, Police Chief Charles Wilson, citing
constitutional concerns and limited resources, refused to deploy
his officers to "go out and treat people like criminals.4 3 In
Tucson, Captain John Leavitt agreed to cooperate with the
Attorney General's request only if it did not violate local
guidelines prohibiting racial profiling." Chicago police, fearful
of souring relationships with local immigrant communities,
initially refused to conduct interviews but later worked out a
plan with the FBI agreeing to provide assistance after the U.S.
Attorney's Office first sent an informational letter to the
interview subjects.5
Symposium participants discussed three questions with
respect to Printz and the interrogation program. First, could
the federal government constitutionally require local police
departments to help interview individuals named on an FBI
list? Second, could the federal government - either Congress or
perhaps even the Department of Justice acting without explicit
congressional authorization - preempt state or local laws, like
the Oregon probable cause law, that prohibit or limit the ability
of police to conduct these kinds of interviews? Third, should the
anti-commandeering doctrine of Printz have an exception for
national security, or should it be replaced by a more flexible,
multi-factor balancing test?"
42 See Butterfield, supra notes 35, 36. The Oregon Attorney General, Hardy
Myers, later issued an opinion that the questioning would not violate state law. See
Sam Howe Verhovek, A Nation Challenged: The Interviews; Federal Effort Does Not
Violate Law, Oregon Attorney General Says, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2001, at B8. Because
there were only about two dozen Portland men on the FBI list, federal authorities
noted that they could interview the men themselves, perhaps with some assistance
from the Attorney General, and thus accept the Portland police position. See id.
43 Butterfield, supra note 35.
id.
45 For a fascinating discussion of the impact of the war on terror on local
policing generally, see William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J.
2137 (2002).
46 See Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz
and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180 (1998) (suggesting that the formalistic,
categorical anti-commandeering principle articulated in Printz is in tension with the
pragmatic and political nature of federalism).
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Participants expressed a wide range of views on the
question of whether Printz is wrong or overly rigid, and
whether the Printz anti-commandeering principle actually
poses any significant problem in the war on terror."
B. Local Resistance to the USA PATRIOT Act: Bill of
Rights Defense Committee Resolutions
Beginning in January 2002 with a resolution in Ann
Arbor, Michigan, the legislatures of four states 8 and several
hundred localities have passed resolutions and ordinances
inspired by model resolutions circulated by the Bill of Rights
Defense Committee (BORDC), opposing aspects of the USA
PATRIOT Act and affirming the state or locality's commitment
to civil liberties. '9
Each of the state resolutions calls on the United States
Congress to repeal provisions of the Patriot Act that allegedly
infringe constitutional rights, and seeks to curtail local
cooperation with the Act's provisions. The Hawaii resolution
prohibits the use of state resources for activities under the
Patriot Act that would infringe individuals' constitutional
rights, including monitoring by state law enforcement
personnel of political and religious gatherings and
eavesdropping on communications between lawyers and their
clients." The Alaska resolution prohibits the state's law
enforcement and other agencies from investigating individuals
and organizations in the absence of probable cause to believe
that the target is involved in criminal activity, from using state
41 Most localities, even if they initially opposed the interrogation program,
ultimately cooperated, sometimes after negotiating about what procedures they would
follow, and sometimes after the state exerted pressure on localities. And since most
localities were cooperating and offering the assistance of their law enforcement
personnel, the FBI would have had sufficient resources to send its own agents into the
limited number of communities where resistance to local enforcement remained
adamant. See Verhovek, supra note 42.
48 Hawaii (Apr. 25, 2003), Alaska (May 21, 2003), Maine (Mar. 23, 2004), and
Vermont (May 28, 2003). See Bill of Rights Defense Committee, Progress on Statewide
Civil Liberties Resolutions, at http://www.bordc.org/states.htm (last visited Aug. 11,
2004).
49 See Bill of Rights Defense Committee, Local Efforts, athttp://www.bordc.org/OtherLocalEfforts.htm (last visited Aug. 11, 2004); Bill of Rights
Defense Committee, Chronology of Civil Liberties Resolutions, Ordinances, and Ballot
Initiatives, at http://www.bordc.org/Chronology.pdf (last visited Aug. 11, 2004).
50 H.C.R. No. 267, 22nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2004), available at
http'//www.capitol.hawaii.gov/sessioncurrent/bills/HCR267-.htm; H.R. No. 192, 22nd
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2004), available at http://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/
sessioncurrent/bills/HR192.htm.
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resources to implement federal immigration law, and from
using racial profiling except to locate a specific suspect
described with reference to the suspect's race." The Vermont
resolution as initially drafted responded to the provision of the
Patriot Act allowing for federal officials to obtain an
individual's library records by requesting that the office of the
Vermont Attorney General provide legal support to any local
library that refuses to turn over a patron's records, while the
version enacted urged amendment of the relevant section of the
Patriot Act to exempt libraries from its reach."
According to the list maintained by the Bill of Rights
Defense Committee as of August 11, 2004,"3 340 cities, towns
and counties around the country had also passed local
resolutions or ordinances. These resolutions contain an even
greater variety of provisions expressing local opposition to the
Patriot Act and limiting the participation of local officials in
the Act's enforcement. The Detroit resolution, passed on
December 6, 2002, expresses concern that the Act undermines
the liberties of local residents of Arab, Muslim, or South Asian
descent and affirms the city's strong support for civil liberties;
requests local libraries to warn their patrons that federal
officers might obtain their library records; and directs the
Detroit city clerk to generate every six months a summary of
information provided to the federal government under the
Patriot Act.' The Portland, Oregon resolution of August 8, 2003
also affirms the city's support for civil liberties; directs the
city's police to refrain from enforcing federal immigration law
and from investigating individuals and groups without
particularized suspicion of criminal activity; and directs the
City Attorney to disclose to the public every three months
information about individuals detained on suspicion of terrorist
activity and to report on any sharing of information with
51 H.J.R. No. 22, 23rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Alaska 2003).
52 Compare J.R.H. No. 9, Resolution as Introduced, 2003-2004 Leg. Sess. (Vt.
2003), available at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/legdoc.cfm?URL=/docs/ 2 0 0 4
resolutn/JRH009.HTM, with J.R.H. No. 9 (No. R-203), Joint Resolution Strongly
Urging the President to Revise Executive Orders and Policies, and for Congress to
Amend Provisions of the U.S.A. Patriot Act, Which Seriously Erode Fundamental Civil
Liberties, 2003-2004 Leg. Sess. (Vt. 2003), available at
http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/legdoc.cfm?URL=/docs/2004/acts/ACTR 2 03.HTM.
Bill of Rights Defense Committee, Local Efforts, available at
http://www.bordc.org/OtherLocalEfforts.htm (last visited Aug. 11, 2004).
64 Local Resolution to Protect Civil Liberties, City Council of Detroit,
Michigan (Dec. 6, 2002), available at http://www.bordc.org/Detroit-res.htm.
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federal officials." Many communities object to their law
enforcement officers assisting in enforcement of federal
immigration laws, on the theory that even illegal immigrants
should be encouraged to use city or state services without fear
if they wish to report a crime, provide information, or use
public health services. An Arcata, California provision imposes
a fine of $57 on any city official who assists in Patriot Act
enforcement.' Political battles are still raging over what
positions local government units will take. In New York City,
for example, at the time of the Trager Symposium the City
Council was debating whether to adopt a variation of the
BORDC resolution, which subsequently passed.7
On this issue, the participants discussed: 1) whether
these state and local resolutions raise any problems of
constitutional dimension, and 2) whether, even if
constitutional, it is inappropriate for state and local
governments to weigh in on the federal government's
prosecution of the war on terror.
One of the first discussions of the BORDC resolutions to
have been published, by symposium participant Professor
Vikram Amar, had noted that the tradition of local
governments weighing in on national policy dates back to the
eighteenth century, when state and local governments served
as "the point of organization" for the Alien and Sedition Acts.
During the pre-Civil War era, abolitionists used their local
governmental bodies to criticize state and federal laws
supporting slavery.' Americans have organized on the local
level, from the Committees of Correspondence to the present.
The participants generally concluded that the expressive and
hortatory portions of the Bill of Rights Defense Committee
Resolutions allow state and local governments to play an
historic and appropriate role, serving as mediators between
individuals who oppose federal policy and the federal
government itself, as well as seedbeds with the potential to
challenge and change federal law. Many of the BORDC
55 Resolution Regarding Patriot Act, City Council of Portland, Oregon (Oct.
29, 2003), available at http://www.bordc.org/portland-res.htm.
See Evelyn Nieves, Local Officials Rise Up to Defy the Patriot Act, WASH.
POST, Apr. 21, 2003, at Al.
57 Res. No. 60-2004, New York City Council (Feb. 4, 2004), available at
http://www.nyccouncil.info/issues/current-legislation.cfm.
58 Vikram David Amar, Is It Appropriate, Under the Constitution, for State
and Local Governments to Weigh in on the War on Terror and a Possible War with
Iraq? (Mar. 7, 2003), at httpJ/writ.news.findlaw.comamar/20030307.html.
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resolutions simply express disagreement with provisions of the
Patriot Act in a way the participants believed was
distinguishable from the local anti-federal policy actions the
Supreme Court found preempted in a pair of recent cases," or
govern only the conduct of state or local law enforcement
officials in doing their own jobs.
To the extent that the BORDC resolutions go beyond
expressing disagreement with federal policy, other questions
arise. For example, some resolutions invite or allow local
governments to draw their own conclusions about whether
federal actors acting under Patriot Act provisions would be
violating federal constitutional law. Amar, in his presentation,
argued that this too is an appropriate role for state and local
governments to play, and that federal officials should be liable
in state courts for their unconstitutional actions.' Allowing
state and local governments to provide such additional
protection for federal constitutional norms would be a dramatic
development in the law of federalism, empowering state and
local governments while imposing tighter constraints on
federal officials.
Finally, provisions of the BORDC resolutions that
prohibit local law enforcement personnel from assisting in
certain federal enforcement efforts, sometimes even
sanctioning them for doing so, raise an additional, challenging
question about the nature of Our Federalism. May the federal
government preempt such laws on the ground that prohibiting
an individual from assisting federal law enforcement agents in
a federal investigation interferes with federal interests, as in
Olmstead? Or under the principle of Printz, might a state
successfully argue that the federal government may not
interfere in a state's own internal organization by encouraging
state or local employees to defy political decisions made by
their legislature or their agency? If the legislature of Arcata,
California wishes to impose a uniform policy on its own city
employees, may the federal government preempt that uniform
policy by demanding that individual city employees be allowed
59 American Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (holding that
federal law preempts California provision of remedies for Holocaust survivors
supplemental to federal government agreements); Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade
Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (holding that federal law preempts Massachusetts policy
governing state's trade with Myanmar).
w See Vikram David Amar, Converse § 1983 Suits in Which States Police
Federal Agents: An Idea Whose Time Has Arrived, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1369 (2004).
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to make their own decisions about whether to cooperate with a
federal investigation?6'
Applying the Supreme Court's current doctrines about
Printz and preemption is only the first step in analyzing such
questions. As McCulloch recognized, federalism, at bottom, is
about political accountability; the constitutional law of
federalism tries to ensure that the appropriate majority can
review the policy decisions and actions of its own government
officials. A state or local legislature expresses the viewpoints of
its constituents precisely because it is politically accountable to
those constituents. Most law enforcement officials are not
directly politically accountable and their policy decisions and
actions are often invisible to the people who pay their salaries
and elect their supervisors. On the other hand, state and local
enforcement officials may find themselves in the position of
Pavlov's dogs, trying to follow inconsistent demands made on
them by federal agents with whom they are working, and state
or local bodies for whom they work.
One concrete example of this conflict between uniform
city policy and federal interests has already arisen and been
litigated in the area of immigration enforcement.
61 See Letter from Susan N. Herman & Jason Mazzone, Professors of Law,
Brooklyn Law School, to A. Gifford Miller, New York City Council Speaker (Dec. 9,
2003), available at http://www.nycbordc.org/federalism.html (arguing that the New
York City resolution subsequently passed is an example of "federalism at its best").
Our structures of federalism are supposed to work by allowing parts of the
country to preserve their distinct voices and to serve their distinct interests.
As a city with a large immigrant population, New York may legitimately
dissent from a national consensus that we should seek security even at the
price of targeting immigrants generally and Arab and Muslim men in
particular. We cannot, of course, prevent federal law enforcement officials
from enforcing federal legislation like the Patriot Act. But we can certainly
instruct our congressional delegation to seek to modify that legislation, and
we can decline to further jeopardize members of our community by calling
upon the New York Police Department and other city law enforcement
agencies not to infiltrate mosques without some particular reason, and not to
frighten immigrants into avoiding the police by questioning their
immigration status when they wish to report a crime.
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C. Local "Cooperation" with Immigration Enforcement and
Federal Preemption
1. Federal Preemption of New York City's "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell" Policy
In 1989, Mayor Ed Koch issued an executive order
providing that no New York City officer or employee shall
transmit information respecting any alien to federal
immigration authorities unless the disclosure was either
required by law, authorized by the alien, or respecting an alien
suspected by the agency of criminal activity. In 1996, Congress,
in section 642 of the federal Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), provided that no
person or agency may prohibit, or in any way restrict, a federal,
state, or local government entity from sending information
regarding an individual's immigration status to the INS,
maintaining such information, or exchanging such information
with any other federal, state, or local government entity. New
York City challenged this provision, arguing that it violates the
Tenth Amendment and the prerogative of New York City to
administer core functions of government, including the
provision of police protection and the regulation of the City's
own work forces. The City's concern was that undocumented
aliens might fear to approach or cooperate with city agencies if
they were afraid that the City would turn them over to the INS
for deportation, and that the City would therefore be hampered
in such functions as providing protection to crime victims and
obtaining the cooperation of witnesses to crimes.
The district court rejected the City's Tenth Amendment
claim and ruled that the City's policy was preempted."2 The
Second Circuit affirmed on a somewhat narrower ground,
finding that the City's concern about protecting the
confidentiality of undocumented aliens had not been expressed
in a confidentiality policy of general applicability.'
On September 17, 2003, Mayor Michael Bloomberg
signed a new executive order governing the acquisition and
disclosure of a range of confidential information, including
61 City of New York v. United States, 971 F. Supp. 789 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), afd,
179 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1999).
6 179 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1999).
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immigration status.' Under the new policy, a New York City
officer or employee may inquire about immigration status only
if: 1) that status is necessary for a determination of eligibility
for some program, service, or benefit, or 2) the officer is
required by law to make such inquiry. Law enforcement
officers may not inquire about immigration status unless
investigating criminal activity other than mere status as an
undocumented alien, and police officers are not to inquire
about the immigration status of crime victims, witnesses, or
others seeking assistance. The new executive order also states
under what circumstances such information may be disclosed.
Immigration status generally may not be disclosed if the
individual is not suspected of illegal activity other than "mere
status as an undocumented alien," but may be disclosed if
"such disclosure is necessary in furtherance of an investigation
of potential terrorist activity."5
The participants discussed three questions with respect
to New York City's former "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, and
its new, federally-mandated "Don't Ask, Do Tell" policy. First,
did the courts properly find the earlier New York City policy
preempted? Second, to what extent may the City be required to
maintain records, inquire about immigration status, or disclose
immigration status? Third, what are the consequences of
voluntary state and local enforcement of civil or criminal
immigration laws?"
2. Local Authority to Enforce Immigration Law?
On June 24, 2002, an internal Department of Justice
(DOJ) memorandum reversed previous DOJ policy by asserting
that state and local law enforcement officials possess at least
some "inherent authority" to arrest and detain people for
violations of immigration law, including civil violations. 7 The
DOJ has requested local law enforcement cooperation as part of
" New York City Executive Order No. 41 (Sept. 17, 2003), available at
http://search.citylaw.org/isysquery/irldl7d2/doc.
65 Id. § 2.
66 See Symposium, Migration Regulation Goes Local: The Role of the States in
U.S. Immigration Policy, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 283 (2002).
67 The memorandum was not released so the breadth of the authority
asserted is not known. A current lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act seeks
disclosure of the memorandum's terms. See Nat'l Council of La Raza v. Department of
Justice (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 14, 2003), complaint available at
http:/www.aclu.org(Files/OpenFile.cfn?id=12356.
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a "narrow anti-terrorism mission," to enhance enforcement of
immigration laws by adding 650,000 state police officers to the
20,000 federal border patrol agents, of whom only 1,947 have
been employed for internal enforcement.'
Some critics question whether this devolution of federal
power is constitutionally permissible.69 Others conclude that
state and local authorities lack inherent authority to arrest for
civil violations of immigration law, but could enforce civil
immigration laws if expressly authorized by federal and state
law.0
Many state and local agencies have agreed to cooperate
in these efforts. Florida officials, for example, completed an
agreement with the Justice Department authorizing thirty-five
state troopers and other officers to arrest immigrants solely for
overstaying a visa or entering the country illegally, even if they
are not suspected of having committed any offense under state
or local law."
With regard to local enforcement of federal immigration
law, the participants discussed: 1) whether local enforcement of
immigration law is constitutional if expressly authorized by
federal law; and 2) whether local officials wielding such
enforcement authority would share the substantial immunity
from judicial review that federal immigration agents enjoy."
68 See Press Release, Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney General (June 5,
2002); see also American Civil Liberties Union Testimony, Hearing on Immigration
Enforcement Since September 11, 2001 Before the Subcommittee on Immigration,
Border Security, and Claims, of the House Judiciary Committee, 108th Cong. (Mar. 8,
2003), available at http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfin?ID=12566&c=206.
69 See, e.g., Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the
Immigration Power, Equal Protection and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U.L. REV. 493, 527-28
(2001).
'0 See, e.g., Jeff Lewis, et al., Authority of State and Local Officers to Arrest
Aliens Suspected of Civil Infractions of Federal Immigration Law, 7 BENDER'S IMMIGR.
BULL. 944 (2002). For an illucidating case, see DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976)
(unanimous opinion by Brennan, J.) (holding that federal immigration law does not
preempt California statute imposing penalties on employers for hiring undocumented
workers).
71 See Susan Sachs, Long Resistant, Police Start Embracing Immigration
Enforcement, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2002, at All.
" Federal courts have ruled that absent federal authorization, a state law
discriminating against legal permanent residents is subject to strict scrutiny as
alienage discrimination. If the law were mandated by federal statute, it would be
subject to the rational basis test applicable to federal immigration authorities. A more
difficult question is whether a permissive federal statute diminishes the level of federal
equal protection to which a state statute is subject. See Aliessa v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d
1085, 1098-99 (N.Y. 2001) (applying strict scrutiny in invalidating state discrimination
against immigrants in welfare program, despite federal authorization).
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3. CLEAR
Legislation pending in the House of Representatives as
of November 2003 under the title Clear Law Enforcement for
Criminal Alien Removal Act of 2003 (CLEAR) proposed to
authorize local law enforcement officials to enforce immigration
law.73 The bill also proposed to use Congress's spending power
to encourage state and local governments to participate in
enforcing immigration laws.74 Under this proposal, two years
after the date of enactment, any state or subdivision of a state
that failed to have in effect a statute that expressly authorized
state and local law enforcement officials "to enforce federal
immigration laws in the course of carrying out the officer's law
enforcement duties shall not receive any of the funds that
would otherwise be allocated to the State under section 241(i)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1231(i))." 5
CLEAR also provided financial incentives by reallocating
forfeited funds to compliant states, and sharing civil penalties
collected due to state and local immigration enforcement with
states and localities."
The participants discussed whether CLEAR, if enacted,
would be constitutional."
D. Federal Preemption vs. State Disclosure Law: The New
Jersey County Jails
Among those detained by federal authorities in the
aftermath of 9/11 were some 762 "special interest" aliens,
primarily men from Arab or South Asian countries who were
detained by the INS for some number of months prior to their
eventual deportation. Many of these detainees were housed in
New Jersey state jails, including Hudson and Passaic County
jails, pursuant to a voluntary agreement the federal
73 Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal (CLEAR) Act of 2003,
H.R. 2671, 108th Cong. § 101 (2003).
" Id. § 102.
75 Id. This section provides for the federal government to reimburse states for
the costs they incur in incarcerating undocumented criminal aliens.
76 Id. § 102-103. Another bill pending in the House would penalize states
allowing undocumented persons to obtain driver's licenses. H.R. 655, 108th Cong.
(2003).
" For a discussion of the desirability of CLEAR, see Julia Malone,
Lawmakers Split on Immigration Act, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Oct. 2, 2003,
at 2B. As of the date of publication of this issue, the CLEAR Act was still pending in
Congress.
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government had previously entered with New Jersey state
authorities to house federal detainees in New Jersey's excess
jail space."
The Department of Justice refused to release the names
of these special interest detainees, even when sued under the
federal Freedom of Information Act." A lawsuit brought in New
Jersey state court' sought to compel the sheriffs and wardens
of the Hudson and Passaic jails to comply with a long-standing
provision of New Jersey state law81 mandating public disclosure
of the identities of all jail inmates, a more explicit state
counterpart to federal disclosure law. The trial court granted
the plaintiffs partial summary judgment, ordering compliatice
with the state law after a limited stay of ten days issued at the
request of the United States (which had been granted
defendant-intervenor status). The United States promptly filed
an appeal and on the same day, April 17, 2002, INS
Commissioner James Ziglar signed an emergency interim
regulation superseding state law by prohibiting state jail
officials from disclosing the identities of the detainees held on
behalf of the INS, whether by contract or otherwise. The
plaintiffs argued that the regulation exceeded the authority
delegated to the Attorney General by Congress, violated the
Administrative Procedure Act in that there had been no notice
and comment period, and violated the Tenth Amendment. The
New Jersey appellate court held that New Jersey law had been
validly preempted and reversed the trial court's order of
disclosure.82
Symposium participants, including lead counsel for
plaintiffs, Dean Ronald Chen (appearing by videotape),
discussed whether the appellate court had correctly found that
the New Jersey disclosure law was preempted.'
78 For a full account, see Ronald K. Chen, State Incarceration of Federal
Prisoners After September 11: Whose Jail is it Anyway?, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1335 (2004).
79 The DOJ was sued in federal court under the Freedom of Information Act.
See Center for National Security Studies v. Department of Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C.
Cir. 2003) (rejecting FOIA request for identities and information about Fall 2001
detainees), cert denied, 124 S. Ct. 1041 (2004).
"o ACLU of New Jersey, Inc. v. County of Hudson, 799 A.2d 629 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2002), cert. denied, 803 A.2d 1162 (N.J. 2002).
81 N.J. STAT. ANN. 30:8-16 (West 2002).
82 ACLU of New Jersey, 799 A.2d 629 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002).
83 See Chen, supra note 78. Under the theory of preemption advanced in
Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It Matters: A Different Approach to
Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313 (2004), a court could not properly have found
preemption because Congress had not acted.
2004] 1223
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
E. Preemption of Local Consent Decrees
In various locations around the country, consent decrees
as well as local laws limit the ability of local police to monitor
and infiltrate political or religious organizations. In New York
City in 1985, following litigation brought by political groups
over police tactics in the 1960s and 1970s, the New York Police
Department (NYPD) entered the Handschu settlement."
Among other things, this settlement, approved by the district
court and upheld by the Second Circuit, prohibited the police
from investigating political organizations without first showing
specific evidence of a pending crime by the group's members;
limited the storage and dissemination of information gathered
about political activities; and created procedures for citizen
complaint and review.
In September 2002, New York City and the NYPD,
citing changed circumstances after 9/11 and the department's
need for greater freedom to investigate suspected terrorist
organizations in order to prevent future attacks, moved
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) to modify
the consent decree. Over the opposition of the original
Handschu plaintiffs, in early 2003 the district court granted
the motion, principally by removing the requirement that the
police demonstrate evidence of pending criminal activity before
investigating a group and its members.85 On August 7, 2003, in
response to the plaintiffs' complaint about police questioning of
anti-war demonstrators arrested at a recent protest rally in
Manhattan, the district court incorporated as part of the
modified decree the NYPD "Guidelines for Investigations
Involving Political Activity," which were based on FBI
Guidelines .86
Meanwhile, a DOJ draft of proposed federal legislation
dubbed "Patriot Act II," leaked to the public in early 2003,
contained a provision that would have discontinued consent
decrees that impeded terrorism investigations conducted by
federal, state, or local officials and would have terminated all
such decrees entered prior to September 11, 2001, including the
For a full description of the history of this litigation, see Jerrold L.
Steigman, Note and Comment, Reversing Reform: The Handschu Settlement in Post-
September 11 New York City, 11 J.L. & POLy 745 (2003).
Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 273 F. Supp. 2d 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
288 F. Supp. 2d 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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Handschu settlement." This legislation had not been
introduced in Congress at the time it garnered national
publicity and still has not been introduced. 8
On this issue, the symposium participants discussed: 1)
whether courts should modify consent decrees on the
application of local police for greater powers to investigate
organizations as part of the war on terror; and 2) under what
circumstances federal law can modify or abolish such consent
decrees. Should it matter whether police departments or cities
that are parties to the original decrees support modification?
F. Other Frontiers of Federalism
Additional federalism issues are presented by the Joint
Terrorism Task Forces that many local governments have
joined, with agreements spelling out the nature of local
cooperation with federal agents. Campus security guards, as
well as police and sheriffs, have been deputized as federal
agents. Even though these forms of cooperation are voluntary,
they challenge our traditional notions about the relationship
between the federal and state/local governments (generally
described as a "dual sovereignty" model).89 And the crucial
question of who will pay for post-9/11 enhanced security raises
questions about unfunded federal mandates and the nature of
the federal financial obligations to state and local governments
on a constitutional as well as a political level.'
Will the war on terror have the unexpected consequence
of breaking down barriers between levels of government, as it
is breaking down barriers between branches of the federal
government? Will the balance of federal/local power shift, as
power has shifted among the branches of the federal
government? The fascinating discussion of the issues described
above can be found on the Brooklyn Law School website" The
87 Draft Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003, § 312, available at
http://www.publicintegrity.org/dtaweb/downloads/Story-01-020703_Doc_1.pdf (last
visited Aug. 10, 2004).
For a bill opposing such legislation, see Benjamin Franklin True Patriot
Act, H.R. 3171, 108th Cong. (2003) (criticizing the USA PATRIOT Act and subsequent
proposed legislation such as the Domestic Security Enhancement Act).
89 For a discussion of this relationship, see Stuntz, supra note 45.
90 See Jason Mazzone, What Congress Owes New York, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24,
2003, at A31.
81 See David G. Trager Public Policy Symposium (2003), at
http://www.brooklaw.edu/news/newsarchive/2003-11-2ltrager symposium.php (last
visited Aug. 10, 2004).
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roundtable discussion was preceded by presentation of the
papers in this issue, which are described briefly below.
IV. PAPERS PRESENTED AT THE SYMPOSIUM
The Trager Symposium began to explore how
constitutional limitations apply both to federal agents engaged
in the war against terrorism and to local officials who are
resisting what they believe to be federal government
overreaching, using the above examples. Professor Ann
Althouse" argued that the structures of federalism provide an
attractive alternative to litigating the constitutionality of
federal government actions in the war on terror. Her paper
maintains that Justice Robert Jackson, concurring in the
Korematsu decision, was right in thinking that courts do not
make sound decisions about the scope of civil liberties during
times of war or national crisis, so that the courts might well
uphold Patriot Act provisions that she might think
unconstitutional. State and local opposition to Patriot Act
policies, on the other hand, might actually cause the federal
government to modify its policies. Althouse discusses the
functions that state and local resistance might serve,
comparing the current round of Bill of Rights Defense
Committee resolutions to the opposition of Sheriff Printz,
whose refusal to enforce a locally unpopular provision of federal
law was upheld by the Supreme Court.
Professor Ernest Young, coming from the other end of
the political spectrum, welcomes Althouse's born again defense
of the structures of federalism. 3 While "states' rights" during
the 1960s was often code for supporters of racial segregation,
Young notes the current phenomenon of liberals coming over to
"the dark side" and finally understanding that the structures of
federalism might, as James Madison believed, provide a
"double security" for liberty.' He describes this opportunistic
attraction to the structures of federalism as an example of the
flexibility of the structures themselves. State and local
government can play an expressive role and can provide a
potential rallying point against undesirable federal policy
92 Ann Althouse, The Vigor of Anti-Commandeering Doctrine in Times of
Terror, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1231 (2004).
93 Young, supra note 13.
'4 THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
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(although Young remains agnostic himself about whether the
Patriot Act provisions are problematic).
Professor Paul Finkelman, a legal historian, described
the pro-slavery origins of our concept of national authority, as
exemplified by the Supreme Court decision in Prigg v.
Pennsylvania,9" in which the Supreme Court ruled that federal
law preempted a Pennsylvania state law providing procedural
protections for fugitive slaves (or people mistakenly believed to
be fugitive slaves) being extradited back into slavery.' In his
article, Finkelman compares Pennsylvania's response to the
prospect of enforcement of the locally detested Fugitive Slave
Law with the refusal of local law enforcement officers to
enforce the locally unpopular Brady Act provision invalidated
in Printz, and the Bill of Rights Defense Committee resolutions
reacting to locally unpopular provisions of the Patriot Act. He
also discusses the Supreme Court's watershed treatment in
Prigg of the question of the scope of local autonomy. Although
the Court held that federal law preempted Pennsylvania's
attempt to add even process-based requirements to the
Fugitive Slave Law designed to impede the actions of federally-
sanctioned slave catchers, Justice Story's opinion suggests that
state officials might not have been required to enforce the
Fugitive Slave Law themselves.
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky presented a paper
arguing that the federal government should not be permitted to
preempt state law unless Congress has clearly made the
decision to do so." Requiring a clear expression of congressional
will as a precondition to a finding of preemption would
empower the states by allowing them more leeway to
implement their own local policies and priorities. Under
Chemerinsky's theory, for example, it would seem that the Bill
of Rights Defense Committee provisions or Oregon state law
probable cause requirements described above could not be
preempted by unilateral action of the Department of Justice.
Chemerinsky would also conclude that the federal agency
regulation could not properly preempt the New Jersey
disclosure law discussed in Dean Ronald Chen's article,98
without congressional action to displace the state law requiring
95 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
Finkelman, supra note 24.
17 Chemerinsky, supra note 83.
98 Chen, supra note 78.
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publication of the identities of the detainees in New Jersey
jails. Chen's article provides background on the sequence of
events and the federal and state actions at issue in the New
Jersey jail case, which provides a sort of Petri dish for
analyzing the scope of national authority and local autonomy.
Finally, Professor Vikram Amar argues that state
courts and legislatures should be afforded authority to sanction
federal officials who violate the federal Constitution within
their states.' This would allow localities leeway to decide for
themselves what conduct would violate federal constitutional
norms, rather than ceding that issue to the federal courts or
any other branch of the federal government, a right some of the
BORDC resolutions claim." Amar's earlier essay on Findlaw °'
discussed the role state and local governments have played at
various times during our history, as mediators between federal
government actions and individual dissent from those actions.
His proposal would provide a new answer to one of the key
questions posed by the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions:
What role may the states play in interpreting and enforcing the
United States Constitution?
V. CONCLUSION
As author Joseph Ellis noted in his popular recent book
on constitutional history' "' part of the genius of our
Constitution is that rather than attempting to answer all
questions about structures, rights, and power, the Constitution
provides a framework for a continuing debate and dialogue
about these issues. The war on terror provides a new and
important backdrop against which some key debates about the
nature of the relationship between the federal and state/local
governments will take place. Brooklyn Law School's Trager
Symposium was the beginning of that debate, but by no means
the end. The description above of the papers, the problems
discussed, the questions raised, and some of the positions
taken, shows that it was not possible in one day, even with an
astoundingly talented group of legal scholars, to exhaust this
topic. In fact, one symposium participant suggested that the
Amar, supra note 60.
,oo See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
101 Amar, supra note 60.
'o' JOSEPH J. ELLIS, FOUNDING BROTHERS: THE REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION
3-19 (2000).
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group should reconvene every six months to monitor and
discuss the continuing challenges the war on terror will
undoubtedly pose to Our Federalism.

